Economists have now studied this Great Housing Convulsion extensively, but many questions remain unresolved. Why did spectacular booms and busts occur when and where they did? Were buyers largely rational, or were their beliefs inconsistent with any sensible model of housing prices? What role did credit markets play in fueling the boom or causing the bust? Finally, what are the policy implications of the Great Convulsion?
This policy brief, drawn from a more detailed lecture and paper 1 , examines America's long history of real estate speculation to shed light on recent events. First, rural land speculation is examined across three time periods -18th Century Speculation in New York State, the 1815-1819 Huntsville Cotton Land Boom, and the 1900-1940 Iowa Wheat Land Cycle. Next, three episodes of urban speculation, confi ned to specifi c cities, are studied -The Chicago Boom: 1830-1841, Los Angeles in the 1880s, and New York City: . Last, metropolitan speculation, spread across urban areas and their surrounding suburbs, is reviewed across three periods and locations -"The Housing Bubble That Didn't Happen" after World War II, California in the 1970s and 1980s, and, fi nally, the Great Housing Convulsion: 1996 Convulsion: -2012 . From these nine episodes, six key lessons are drawn.
The fi rst and most obvious lesson of this history is that America has always been a nation of real estate speculators. Real estate speculation was an integral part of the "winning of the west," the construction of our cities, and the transformation of American home life, from tenements to mini-mansions.
The second lesson is that these boom-bust cycles can generate signifi cant social costs, primarily through ensuing fi nancial chaos. This fact implies some urgency to rethinking the national and local policies that impact housing markets. If buyers are particularly prone to engage in wishful thinking about future price appreciation, then policies that encourage homeowner borrowing can lead to larger social losses.
The third lesson is that the high prices paid during the boom and the low prices paid during the bust are typically compatible with reasonable models of housing valuation and defensible beliefs about future price growth. Manhattan's builders in 1929 could justify their land purchases based on offi ce rents at the time. Real estate economists have examined price-to-rent ratios in 2004 and argued that they seemed reasonable given plausible expectations about future price growth and current capital costs.
The fourth major lesson is that under-priced default options can often help explain high A Nation of Gamblers: Real Estate Speculation and American History prices even though low interest rates have been less important than other factors in generating price booms. The Chicago land boom of 1836-37 was coincident with the chartering of two new state-supported Illinois banks. Securitization of mortgages for builders in the 1920s appears to have decreased the downsides of development, and increased credit availability also boosted prices during the recent boom.
The fi fth lesson is that the dominant mistake made by investors is underestimating the impact that elastic long-run supply of land, structures and crops will have on future land values. Land buyers during Alabama's 1819 land boom look sensible given then-current cotton prices and trends, but land values depreciated as cotton prices fell with increased U.S. and worldwide supply. Home buyers in Las Vegas and Phoenix in 2005 seem to have misunderstood the almost perfectly elastic supply of homes in America's deserts.
The sixth lesson is that the Great Housing Convulsion of the past 16 years is unlike boom. The fi rst is a "Gordonian" approach, which uses fi nance to determine the net present value of a property. The second is the "Von Thunenite" approach, based on the RosenRoback economic model, which justifi es prices by comparing local prices to the prices in similar geographic areas, thus determining if a given local price is "reasonable." Buyers' primary error appears to be a failure to internalize Alfred Marshall's dictum that "the value of a thing tends in the long run to correspond to its cost of production." Frequently supply of land and housing is ignored, but land is abundant in the United States, and even the most desirable cities can be reproduced. Additionally, building upthrough skyscrapers -can provide a virtually limitless supply of space. However, this error is better seen as limited cognition-failing to use a sophisticated model of global supply and demand -than as stupidity or irrationality. Morris resold the land in 1791 for 75,000 pounds, or $343,800 (about $8.4 million in 2012 dollars), making a substantial profi t. He plowed his earnings into massive land purchases both in New York and in other states, but faced increasingly diffi cult credit conditions. Morris' ability to meet his debts deteriorated, and he progressively mortgaged his property. Eventually, he was unable to meet his obligations and become bankrupt.
Rural Speculation
Morris' land purchases were not at absurd "bubble" level prices, but rather at prices that were quite low both relative to future prices and relative to prices elsewhere in the country. Credit market tightening helps explain Morris' decline, but increases in easy credit do not seem to have fueled his earlier buying. However, there is a credit puzzle hidden in the Morris story. The people who invested in Morris did not have the same upside potential that the equity owners did. Yet they lent money at relatively standard interest rates, suggesting that, like recent purchasers of mortgage-backed securities, they may have underestimated the risks inherent in real estate speculation.
The 1815-1819 Huntsville Cotton Land Boom
Before the national fi nancial crisis known as the Panic of 1819, Huntsville, Alabama was the epicenter of the housing boom. It combined excellent cotton-growing soil with access to the Tennessee River, which brought access to the Ohio River, the Mississippi River and, ultimately, the Gulf of Mexico. Transportation was the key to making frontier land valuable, and water was the key to transportation. 5,610 acres of public land in Madison County, Alabama (which contains Huntsville) were sold In 1819, the boom busted, the country went into recession and Alabama land values plummeted. Land buyers owed $21 million to the Federal government in 1820, and $12 million of that amount was due from Alabama itself. The government responded to these debts with various relief measures and it reduced the credit available for buying public land.
These boom prices were not as unreasonable as they might fi rst appear. Alabama land yielded large amounts of cotton, and prices of cotton and demand for cotton were high. When cotton prices fell, land prices followed. The Alabama boom and bust illustrates a phenomenon that will reappear throughout these real estate episodes: an under-appreciation of the longrun power of elastic supply to push prices downward. At current cotton prices, land prices in 1818 Alabama were justifi able. But since land was so freely available, in the U.S. and elsewhere, a smart investor might have reasoned that prices would eventually fall so that land prices in Alabama would resemble land prices of similarly productive places throughout the world. That logic would have made the land buyer of 1818 far warier about paying so much for even prime Alabama land.
The boom was not initiated by any change in credit policies for public land, but instead
The Alabama boom and bust illustrates a phenomenon that will reappear throughout these real estate episodes: an underappreciation of the long-run power of elastic supply to push prices downward.
fueled by optimism about uncertain economic fundamentals, such as declining transport costs and English demand for American cotton. Alabama's land prices were not obviously rational in 1818, but they weren't obviously irrational either. Ex post, the Alabama speculators look foolish, but ex ante, there was enough uncertainty to justify the buying; prices would have been reasonable as long as cotton prices stayed high, and that was hardly such a crazy thought.
The 1900-1940 Iowa Wheat Land Cycle
During the period from 1900-1930, prices for rural land, particularly in Iowa, fi rst rose dramatically, reaching historic heights in the early teens, before dropping during the 1920s, almost ten years before the Great Depression. The price growth of land during the fi rst decades of the 20th century was understandable, as both wheat yields and wheat prices were steadily increasing over this period. In fact, national wheat prices had increased 34 percent (in real terms) from 1910-1916. Unfortunately, wheat prices switched from growth to decline in 1917, when they hit their 20th century peak. International supply recovered after World War I and American production stayed high. Over the 1920s, the growth in world wheat production appeared to be seriously outpacing the growth in world wheat demand, and prices of wheat, and thus rural land values, plummeted. Though reasonable projections of increases in wheat prices, yields and lower transportation costs could readily justify the high land values seen during the boom years, those projections were wrong, and farmers should have anticipated the fall in prices that would eventually result from abundant supply. Still, it would be a far-sighted farmer indeed who wouldn't have been optimistic given over a decade's worth of positive price movements. However, across the U.S. as a whole, farm debt per acre increased fi ve-fold between 1910 and 1920, and this subsequent price collapse led to fi nancial failures.
Urban Speculation
The Chicago Boom:1830-1841
The Many authors-Hoyt among them-discuss the contribution of the role of easy money after 1835 to the boom and bust. Since the Bank of Illinois was a creature of state policy, and since the legislature pushed the bank to support real estate, it is certainly possible that the Bank was not charging appropriate interest rates given the probability of default. In 1837, there was widespread panic, and in May 29, 1837, the Illinois banks suspended payments. As the banks careened towards bankruptcy, Illinois' internal improvements, like the canals which were supposed to be fi nanced by the banks, stopped.
However, the optimists were vindicated in the long run. Even the buyers of the most expensive tract in the loop in 1836, on Dearborn Avenue near the Chicago River, experienced 3.6 percent real property value appreciation over the next twenty years.
However,ex post justifi cation is dangerous. Chicago is studied precisely because it ended up as a success. Yet numerous other never-built communities that went through land boom and bust cycles during the same period are not well-understood.
Los Angeles in the 1880s
Los Angeles in the 1800s, the "Chicago of the West," experienced a substantial run-up in values during the 1880s and a subsequent reversal based on land value data from reported sales in the Los Angeles Times from 1882 to 1889. The median price per square foot, in 2012 dollars, increases from 1.8 cents in 1882 to 2.8 cents in 1885. In 1886, the real price per square rises to 6.9 cents, and then 9.3 cents in 1887 and 18 cents in 1888, before the price returns to 12 cents in 1889. The 90th percentile price in 1888 is 70 cents per square foot.
The Los Angeles boom was precipitated by the entry of the Sante Fe railroad into the Los Angeles market, which caused the price of transport for people and goods to drop dramatically, and the population of Los Angeles increased from six thousand to fi fty thousand between 1885 and 1890. Migrants saw benefi ts in the southern California climate, the agricultural value of its land and the economic opportunity, created partially by real estate speculation.
Within Los Angeles, there was considerable demand for rented residential and commercial space, and given the high rents charged by landlords and the relatively cheap prices of land and construction prices seemed reasonable. Los Angeles prices could also be justifi ed using comparisons to other cities. Residential properties in Los Angeles cost 40 percent of prices in Cleveland or Chicago, and the Times repeatedly compared Los Angeles with San Francisco and pronounced its own city cheap.
Prices declined after 1888, but Southern California continued to grow. Since aggressive fi nancing was provided by sellers not banks, there was no fi nancial crisis during the bust. Los Angeles did have a large boom-bust cycle and people who bought during the boom did lose money. Yet prices were also quite justifi ed given subsequent events, at least in the city itself. The biggest losses were sustained by investors in outlying boom-towns, who don't seem to have focused on the virtually limitless supply of space in greater Los Angeles, at least relative to the demand during the 19th century. Nicholas and Scherbina (2011) . Can these higher prices be reconciled with rational buyer beliefs? From an analysis of the costs and revenues of both a tenement purchaser intending to rent out rooms and a builder of skyscraper looking for sell offi ce space, both the standard tenement purchaser and the skyscraper builder of the late 1920s could expect to receive a relatively good return on investment. Additionally, given the cost of living and productivity of those in New York city, the prices paid seemed reasonable when compared with other cities of the time.
As for the role of credit, it is more likely that an under-priced default option played more of a role in encouraging the speculative activities of builders. While some mega-buildings of the 1920s, including the Chrysler and Empire State Buildings were largely self-fi nanced, there was an impressive increase in the securitization business for property-backed securities. These securities were bought by ordinary investors, in search of a six percent return, and those investors may well have under-appreciated the value of the default option that they were giving the building's promoters. 
California in the 1970s and 1980s
For the fi rst half of the post-war period, California housing prices didn't seem all that different from prices elsewhere in the U.S. Between 1950 and 1970 , housing values in the California metropolitan areas didn't grow much faster than in other American metropolitan areas. By contrast, between 1970 and 1990, price growth was signifi cantly higher annually in California than elsewhere.
The shift in California prices wasn't rooted in changes in credit markets: real mortgage rates were rising over much of this time period, and local economic conditions don't seem to have driven the price rise. Rising wages or productivity when compared to other geographical areas are also not enough to explain the shift. However, there was a major shift in California's housing markets in the 1970s: new supply fell signifi cantly. In the early sixties, California was responsible for over a fi fth of the total number of permits in the United States. But permitting dropped off signifi cantly after 1965, and the housing stock grew by only 32 percent in the 70s and just 21 percent in the 1980s.
What caused this shift? Starting in the early 1960s, activists started using environmental arguments to justify barriers to new building. All major private developments became required to go through an environmental impact review process, and there were myriad local regulations as well, such as 60 acre minimum lot sizes. Limits on supply would have driven up prices in any case, but buyers seem to have been particularly optimistic about future price growth, expecting increases in prices to top 14% over the next decade.
The events after 1989 were typical for the ends of booms, as supply gradually increased and prices gradually fell. Prices took a long time to reach bottom, but fi nally in 1996, real prices in Los Angeles hit 62 percent of the peak level. The California boom and bust is the precursor to the great convulsion of the last 10 years. The earlier event featured real shocks to housing supply and a somewhat limited ability to provide abundant housing elastically, especially in a short time period. Across metropolitan areas during this period, there was a tight connection between inelastic housing supply and the extent of price appreciation. The prices during both the boom and the bust were compatible with reasonable valuation models. Those models just weren't right.
The Great Housing Convulsion between 1996 and 2012
The basic contours of the period from 1996 to 2012 are well known. Perhaps the most plausible explanation is that slowing price growth led to a reassessment of future price growth, which is often given as an explanation for the end of a speculative boom.
Conclusion
The housing convulsion that occurred between 1996 and 2012 has many precedents in U.S. history. Americans have been speculating heavily on real estate for centuries, and vast fortunes have regularly been won and lost. Many things are similar between the most recent boom and previous events. Rising prices are most strongly associated with optimistic expectations, and credit market conditions more typically played a supporting role. The optimistic expectations have been justifi able based on recent experience and a simple capitalization formula (the Gordonian approach) and by Thunenite comparisons with land prices or rents in other areas.
In the most recent boom, paying high prices required an optimistic assessment of future price growth. Expecting a better future was also critical to the rural land boom on the New York frontier in the 1790s, in Iowa in 1910, and in the urban booms of Chicago in the 1830s and Los Angeles in the 1880s and 1980s. In other cases, such as the Alabama land boom of 1819 and tenements in New York during the 1920s, prices were reasonable even if rents would stay constant.
Booms end when these optimistic projections fail to materialize, at least in the short run, but in many cases, the shocks seem like they should have been predictable to a forecaster with a Marshallian appreciation for the power of longrun elastic supply. A suffi ciently well-informed buyer in Alabama in 1819 should have been able to expect that world-wide cotton supply would push prices down, just like a skyscraper builder in 1920s Manhattan should have been able to predict that abundant offi ce space should decrease rents dramatically. In the recent boom, suffi ciently well-informed buyers in Las Vegas presumably should have recognized that America's incredible abundance of desert space would ultimately limit the long run value of homes on the urban fringe of that metropolis.
The diffi culties in forecasting the impact of supply are both understandable and hard to arbitrage. They are understandable, because the cognitive requirements needed to forecast the impact of global supply conditions on local property values are large. To an economist with the benefi t of hindsight, the drop in cotton prices after 1819 may seem highly predictable, but why should that have been true among cotton farmers on America's frontier?
The ubiquitous nature of housing convulsions remind us that seemingly safe real estate investments can leave a gaping hole in bank balance sheets when things go sour. The tendency of markets to crash teaches that under-priced default options can lead to large social losses, especially because of fi nancial meltdowns. This fact implies that there may be advantages if bank regulators recognize the regular tendency of real estate values to mean revert after booms.
To an economist with the benefi t of hindsight, the drop in cotton prices after 1819 may seem highly predictable, but why should that have been true among cotton farmers on America's frontier?
